3 course --that is, leaving decisions to non-specialists after giving them informed input --is more the norm in governmental process. Political figures very rarely have subscribed to what has been described as the "flight from reason," the recent doctrine of denouncing science, including physics, as being on a par with beliefs in mysticism and religion and being simply a construct of the mind, unrelated to objective nature.
Most physics advice to government relates to decision-making in the face of projected or conjectured developments. Advice is firmly rooted in established scientific facts but must extrapolate beyond those facts based on the experience and judgment of the advisor and provide an analysis of future values and risks. It is in communicating risk --that is, the product of probability of a future event times the consequences of the event --where the physicist may face the greatest difficulty. Government decision-makers prefer to deal in absolutes. Is the decision certain to provide a beneficial product or solve a special problem?
In the face of uncertainty, there is a tendency in the political process, when faced with highly dubious, but widely disseminated, physical evidence to play it safe by misinterpreting the need for "balance" by giving equal weight to unsupported conjectures and to solid evidence.
The recent excessive attention paid to the alleged health effects of electromagnetic fields of power lines is a case in point.
There is another serious problem of physics advice to government reflected in the questions: Who owns the advice? Who owns the advisor? If advice from outside is sought by an agency of government, then presumably the advisor is also free to state his views to any other audience he chooses, be it public or private. However, if groups of advisors are impaneled as ongoing committees at a high level, then their advice becomes part of the functioning of government and the question of having these advisors speak publicly on issues before them can be problematic. This tension is best illustrated by events surrounding the rise and fall of the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), whose membership initially was dominated by a majority of physicists.
After the Soviets successfully launched Sputnik in 1957, the alarm caused by that event persuaded President Eisenhower to elevate an obscure group of advisors (which had previously been buried in the Executive Office Building adjacent to the White House under the aegis of the Office of Emergency Management) to the exalted level of the Office of the President. Replacing I. I. Rabi, who had served part time, James R. Killian, Jr. became chairman of the new PSAC and also served as full-time Science Advisor to the President.
PSAC subsequently became an important part of the decision-making process within the White House. Advice was rendered on a private, privileged basis. Presidents could, and of course did, avail themselves of many other inputs --whether technical, economic or political --to their decisions. Thus, the world generally did not know whether a Presidential Decision was carried out following advice of PSAC or by ignoring or rejecting it.
As long as PSAC considered itself to be part of the President's "family," or followed the rules governing full-time Presidential appointees, this privacy remained unbroken.
Members of PSAC were prominent scientists, serving part-time, and continued to pursue their regular professional or academic roles. Being prominent individuals, they were occasionally asked to give their opinions elsewhere. For example, when President Nixon announced his decision to go forward with government support for development of a commercial supersonic transport plane (SST), he signaled that he received sound scientific advice but failed to state that the advice rendered by PSAC opposed pursuit of this adventure. When a member of PSAC subsequently testified on the SST before Congress, he explained that subsidizing the construction of an SST was inadvisable for economical and other reasons. PSAC members also publicly opposed Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) defense systems, contravening presidential policy. The independence of the advisors and lack of "political reliability" was the primary reason for the decreasing influence of PSAC and its eventual abolishment by President Nixon in early 1973.
Advice by physicists and other scientists to the Legislative branch of government faces similar problems. PSAC and its chairman were not obliged to testify before Congress. It is difficult to assemble advisors in physics who do not have some level of conflictof-interest between the advice they are to render and their own interests and work. While there is a clear need for an advisor to be an "independent expert," it is difficult to find people, however capable, who are both sufficiently expert and sufficiently independent. For the above reasons, physics input to the government is also provided through non-governmental institutions, among them the National Academy of Sciences, chartered by President Lincoln in 1863 with the explicit mission of rendering advice to the government. It has a long tradition in doing so. Since members of the Academy are elected for their contributions to science rather than for their connection with government, it is somewhat easier for the Academy to put together truly independent panels of scientists. Indeed the Academy generally through its research arm, the National Research Council, has produced numerous studies in fields where science and policy interact, many of which are of interest to physicists. Recent examples among many include studies on future energy demand and alternate sources of supply, nuclear weapons policy, and the prospects for fusion energy. Additional nongovernmental organizations, including the American Physical Society, have conducted studies and rendered advice to the government in selected subjects. Its Directed Energy
Weapons study was an outstanding example of an independent influential assessment of a contentious technical program. The JASON group, founded by physicists, is an effective group of academic scientists which serves the Government through its studies while at the same time replenishing the pool of young academic physicists knowledgeable in security matters. Now let me turn to government in physics --the support of physics by government.
There is universal agreement that basic research must largely be supported by the federal government. Private industry can hardly be expected to recapture the benefits of basic research within a time span that provides for a reasonable rate of return, and many basic research results do not lead to applications at all. The time span between initial results of basic research and practical applications has become so large that only the federal government can make the required investment. Much ink has been spilled defining "criteria for scientific choice," to use a phrase coined by Alvin Weinberg in the 1960's. Such criteria rank different subfields of physics in terms of their intrinsic interest, economic promise, value to national security, and relevance to other fields of science. That latter factor is greatly subject to change. High energy physics was always considered to be of high intrinsic interest, but its intimate relevance to understanding the cosmos has emerged only recently. Nuclear physics before the war was thought to be only of intellectual relevance, but its dramatic applications emerged after the discovery of nuclear fission. And so it goes. Lately we have even seen a debate expressing doubts on the linkage between microscopic and macroscopic physics, where again that debate confuses the basic connectedness with the calculational difficulty of deducing the large from the small.
In view of the intractability of the ground rules for support, many attempts have been made to rationalize the process. Peer review is used extensively to evaluate the scientific soundness and expectation for success of proposals for support by the federal government, but such reviews cannot answer questions of the relative levels of support for different fields of science, let alone the total outlay for science. One of the failures of PSAC in its heyday had to do with the establishment of scientific priorities. While PSAC was highly successful in providing policy input at the highest federal level, it did little to sort out conflicting claims on the federal purse. In fact, PSAC (and other high-level sources of scientific advice) had to lean over backwards to demonstrate that its mission was to provide service to the federal government and that it was not a built-in "science lobby."
At the suggestion of PSAC, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) began preparing multiyear surveys of the various subfields of science, including ground-based astronomy, high energy physics and plasma physics. In particular a series of "Physics Surveys" produced by NAS committees chaired by prominent physicists (Pake, Bromley and Brinckman) were of great value in identifying opportunities for creative research to governmental officers. Such panels can and do prepare excellent reports on the basic soundness of future undertakings in the respective subfields, and they successfully identify a "maximum responsible program" --that is, a program that could be carried out productively by the talent available in the field. Thus, as a practical matter, the Academy's survey reports recommend feasible programs that are then cut by federal program officers in accordance with the financial constraints imposed by the Office of Management and Budget and eventually the Congress. Additionally, many government agencies maintain panels advising their program officers on the technical merit of competing plans. These panels such as the High Energy Physics Advisory Panel (HEPAP) and analogous panels on Nuclear Physics, Basic Energy Sciences, etc. provide valuable input to decisions on the distribution of resources within each subfield but can do little to affect total funding levels. This multifaceted system of determining support of physics by the federal government has evident flaws, but designing a better methodology has thus far proven elusive. In fact, the U.S. system has largely been emulated by foreign governments, such as those of the UK. and Germany.
Lately, in particular when dealing with "big science" projects, statements abound that the United States can no longer "afford" to pursue such projects nationally and that therefore international collaboration is essential. There is indeed broad human value in international collaboration in support of physics. Results in physics are universal and not owned by any one nation. There is such a thing as an international community of physicists sharing responsibility for the pursuit of their science. International collaboration in physics improves understanding among the world's nations and ethnic groups and creates a forum in which difficult international problems can be aired.
But the purely economic arguments for international collaboration are relatively weak.
One must recognize that, notwithstanding the social benefits of international collaboration, the technical efficiency of carrying out a program internationally tends to be lower than that of national endeavors. The U.S. gross national product is over one-quarter of that of the entire world, notwithstanding that its population is only about four percent of the total. Thus the statement that the United States "cannot afford" pursuit of basic science above a certain level when that support is only a small fraction of one percent of the GNP is hard to justify logically. The level of support the government sets for physics is a matter of policy and politics, not affordability.
The ambivalence in U.S. policy about international collaboration can be illustrated by the history of the ill-fated Superconducting Super Collider (SSC). When President Reagan announced his support for the SSC he touted it as an example of "American competitiveness."
Yet one of the criticisms strongly voiced in Congress before cancellation of the SSC was that sufficient international funds, in particular from Japan, were not forthcoming.
Physics research supported by the government occurs in a variety of modalities. Some is carried out by universities, some by industry, some by government-owned laboratories, and some by national laboratories operated either by profit-making or non-profit entities, including universities.
The national laboratories were created during World War II in part to avoid the bureaucratic restrictions, including Civil Service rules, that apply to government-owned laboratories and also in response to the limited research productivity of industrial laboratories before the war. During that war, physics at most universities was mobilized and supported through a government organization, the National Defense Research Council, which evolved into the Office of Scientific Research and Development under the leadership of Vannevar Bush. The obvious leap in research productivity due to this arrangement led to the dramatic increase in government support of science. Some wartime laboratories, created to discharge specific responsibilities in fields like reactor research and development, naval reactors, and nuclear weapons continued as national laboratories into peace time. In addition, new national laboratories were created for "big physics," supporting work largely of interest to universities but where no single university was able to carry out the work solely under its own auspices.
The essence of national laboratories is that their facilities are available nationwide without preference given to the managing entity. While industrial contractors are selected competitively among qualified performers and directed by the government, the contractual relationships governing laboratories were generally designed in a spirit of partnership with the government. When issues of policy relating to nuclear weapons or to reactor design were discussed within the Executive branch of the government or before Congressional committees, for example, input was generally provided by representatives of the laboratories.
This partnership has now begun to erode. Some of the national laboratories have lost their primary mission and become multipurpose laboratories dedicated to various areas of applied research, with their main assets being their scientific talent and capable management.
In such a role they are no longer unique and compete to some extent with one another and with industrial laboratories. However, several national laboratories remain "single-purpose" laboratories, in particular those operating in high energy physics and plasma physics. This evolution is symptomatic of a basic problem in the conduct of big or small physics research. Creativity in physics thrives best under a system of decentralized initiative, originating from capable and inventive performers, with management facilitating the work rather than directing it. Yet some "big physics" projects demand centralized and responsible management to generate large facilities, such as high energy accelerators and colliders, fusion devices, large detectors, and the like on a proposed schedule and within the allocated budget.
Thus, a successful partnership between government and laboratories demands a delicate balance among decentralized initiative, responsible management, and economic accountability.
Let me close by identifying one contentious issue common to both physics in government and government in physics; this is the relation of physics to national and international security. Indeed physical scientists --remember Archimedes providing As we relate the experience of the twentieth to the twenty-first century, we must expect some shift of government involvement triggered by the rapid emergence of biotechnology and also by the understandable focus, in particular of the Congress, on health.
While physical tools have been of overwhelming importance to the military in the past, the threat of biological warfare is becoming progressively real; moreover, diseases in war have killed more people than those who perished in combat. Thus any projection of physics and government into the next century has to be tempered by the likelihood that the importance of that connection relative to involvement of government with the biological sciences will shrink. But during the century reviewed here physics and government has been a unique and productive alliance. Indeed there remain problems and unresolved issues, but most of these are inherent to any interaction between the general public and what is fundamentally an intellectual endeavor.
